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Abstract
Abel (2002) proposes a resolution of the riskfree rate and the equity premium puzzles by
considering pessimism and doubt. Pessimism is characterized by subjective probabilistic
beliefs about consumption growth rates that are stochastically dominated by the objective
distribution. The subjective distribution is characterized by doubt if it is a mean−preserving
spread of the objective distribution. This note offers a decision theoretic foundation of Abel's
ad−hoc definitions of pessimism and doubt under the assumption that individuals exhibit
ambiguity attitudes in the sense of Schmeidler (1989). In particular, we show that the
behavior of a representative agent, who resolves her uncertainty with respect to the true
distribution of asset returns in a pessimistic way, is the equivalent to pessimism in Abel's
sense. Furthermore, a representative agent, who takes into account pessimistic as well as
optimistic considerations, may result in the equivalent to doubt in Abel's sense.
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1 Introduction
Abel (2002) convincingly argues that the assumption of pessimism and doubt may both
help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle (Weil, 1989) and the equity premium puzzle (Mehra
and Prescott, 1985). By dropping the rational expectations assumption, Abel defines a
pessimist as a decision maker whose subjective probabilistic belief about consumption
growth rates is stochastically dominated by the objective distribution. Accordingly,
a decision maker is characterized by doubt if her subjective probabilistic belief about
consumption growth rates represents a mean-preserving spread of the objective distrib-
ution. As a shortcoming of his approach, Abel does not provide any further explanation
why individuals might systematically commit such a specific violation of the rational
expectations assumption.
The present note oﬀers a decision-theoretic rationale for the occurrence of decision
making that can be formally described as pessimism or doubt in the sense of Abel. Key
to our approach is the assumption that individuals may exhibit ambiguity attitudes in
the sense of Schmeidler (1989) and who may thus, for example, commit the Ellsberg
Paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). Following Schmeidler, we formalize such individuals as CEU
(=Choquet Expected Utility) decision makers, that is, they maximize expected utility
with respect to non-additive beliefs. Properties of non-additive beliefs are used in the
literature for formal definitions of, e.g., ambiguity and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler,
1989; Epstein, 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacchi, 2002), pessimism and optimism (Eich-
berger and Kelsey, 1999; Wakker, 2001; Chateauneuf et al., 2005), as well as sensitivity
to changes in likelihood (Wakker, 2004).
Our approach focuses on non-additive beliefs that are defined as neo-additive capac-
ities in the sense of Chateauneuf et al. (2005). Neo-additive capacities are non-additive
beliefs that stand for marginal deviations from additive beliefs such that uncertainty is
resolved by a combination of pessimistic and optimistic attitudes. In particular, a neo-
additive capacity is characterized by a parameter δ (degree of ambiguity) which measures
the lack of confidence the decision maker has in some additive probability distribution π.
Moreover, the ambiguous part of a decision maker’s belief puts some weight (measured
by the degree of optimism λ) on the best consequence as well as some weight (measured
by the degree of pessimism γ = 1− λ) on the worst consequence possible.
In the context of Abel’s model, we interpret this additive probability distribution π
as the representative agent’s estimator for the underlying objective probability process
of asset returns. Under the rational expectations paradigm the estimator π must, first,
coincide with the “true” probability distribution and, second, the individual must not
be ambiguous about her subjective belief, i.e., δ = 0. Analogously to the rational
expectations approach, we assume that π is indeed the correct estimator for the “true”
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probability distribution. However, our approach deviates from the rational expectations
paradigm since we allow for the possibility that the decision maker is not entirely certain
about whether her estimator π coincides with the “true” probability distribution. Hence,
δ > 0 might be possible. The predominantly pessimistic (optimistic) CEU decision
maker of our model then resolves this lack of confidence in her estimator π in a pessimistic
(optimistic) way by putting additional decision-weight on the possibility that the worst
(best) consequence realizes for which γ = 1 (λ = 1).
Since the assumption of CEU decision makers with purely pessimistic beliefs success-
fully accommodates widely observed paradoxes of the Ellsberg type, our results support
the presumption that real-life individuals can be formally described as pessimistic deci-
sion makers in the model of Abel. Evenmore relevantly, our decision theoretic foundation
of Abel’s assumption of doubt is related to recent empirical evidence showing that real-
life decision makers take into account optimistic as well as pessimistic considerations
(Kilka and Weber, 2001; Abdellaoui et al., 2004; Wakker, 2004).
We further demonstrate that the CEU of an act with respect to a neo-additive ca-
pacity can be equivalently described by the α-maxmin expected utility with respect to
multiple priors (α-MEU) of an act which encompasses the original multiple priors ap-
proach of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) as a special case (see, e.g., Ghirardato et al.,
1998; Ghirardato et al., 2004; Siniscalchi, 2005). In particular, we demonstrate the
equivalence between the CEU with respect to neo-additive capacities and the α-MEU
with respect to so-called ε-contaminated priors used in Bayesian statistics (Berger and
Berliner, 1986) that may be interpreted as neo-additive capacities.
Chen and Epstein (2002) also discuss Abel’s ad hoc assumptions and base their
model of ambiguity averse decision makers on the multiple priors model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). While our motivation is similar, our approach diﬀers in two impor-
tant respects. First, while the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) can be used to equivalently describe pessimistic decision behavior in the sense
of Abel, it cannot provide a formal equivalent for Abel’s notion of doubt because - in
contrast to the α-MEU approach - it neglects any optimistic considerations in the case
of ambiguity.1 Second, our assumption of neo-additive capacities, where the subjective
estimator π just coincides with the true probability distribution represents only a slight
- though in our opinion compelling - interpretational deviation from the rational ex-
pectations assumption. In our opinion, the concept of neo-additive capacities provides
a more intuitive framework for modelling slight subjective distortions of true probabil-
1The concept of robust decision making as a deviation from expected utility theory due to cautious
behavior recently developed in Hansen et al. (1999) and Anderson et al. (2003) does also not provide
a formal equivalent for Abel’s notion of doubt.
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ity distributions than the multiple priors approach which is sometimes based on rather
arbitrary sets of priors.
The remainder of this comment proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader
to Choquet expected utility theory with a strong focus on neo-additive capacities. In
Section 3 we demonstrate that a CEU decision maker with purely pessimistic beliefs can
equivalently be formalized as a pessimist in the sense of Abel. We also show that CEU
decision making which takes into account optimistic as well as pessimistic considerations
is the analogue to doubt in Abel’s sense. All formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Choquet Expected Utility Theory and Neo-Additive
Capacities
As a proposal for accommodating the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), CEU the-
ory was first axiomatized by Schmeidler (1986, 1989) for the framework of Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) who assume the existence of random devices, generating objective
probabilities. Subsequently, Gilboa (1987) as well as Sarin and Wakker (1992) have pre-
sented CEU axiomatizations for the Savage (1954) framework - where probabilities are
derived from betting behavior as an exclusively personalistic concept - whereby Sarin
and Wakker (1992) additionally assume the existence of ambiguous versus unambiguous
events. CEU theory is equivalent to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992; Wakker and Tversky, 1993) restricted to the domain of gains (compare Tversky
and Wakker, 1995). Moreover, as a representation of preferences over lotteries CEU the-
ory coincides with rank dependent utility theory as introduced by Quiggin (1981, 1982),
which is used to accommodate Allais-paradoxes (Allais, 1954).
Adopting the Anscombe-Aumann framework, we presume that the set of conse-
quences, X, is some set of lotteries (=objective probability distributions). An act, f ,
is then a mapping from the set of states of the world into some set of consequences,
i.e., f : S → X. Given that preferences over acts satisfy the Schmeidler axioms, such
preferences are representable by utility numbers that result from (Choquet-) integration
of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices u : X → R with respect to some capacity.
A capacity (non-additive belief), ν, on the state space S is a real-valued set function on
the subsets of S which satisfies
(i) ν (∅) = 0, ν (S) = 1
(ii) A ⊂ B ⇒ ν (A) ≤ ν (B)
ForA ⊂ S let u (f (A)) := u (f (s)) if u (f (s)) = u (f (s0)) for all s, s0 ∈ A. For a given
act f denote by A1, ..., Am the partition of S such that u (f (A1)) > ... > u (f (Am)).
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Define
w (Ai) := [ν (A1 ∪ ... ∪Ai)− ν (A1 ∪ ... ∪Ai−1)] , (1)
where we apply the convention that ν (A1 ∪A0) = 0. Recall the definition of Choquet
integration:
Definition 1: The Choquet expected utility of an act f with respect to capacity ν is
defined by
CEU (f, ν) :=
mX
i=1
u (f (Ai)) · w (Ai) (2)
Definition 2 (Chateauneuf et al., 2005): Neo-additive capacities
A neo-additive capacity ν is defined as a linear combination of (i) an additive belief
π, (ii) a non-additive belief ωp (where only the universal event S is considered
as relevant), and (iii) a non-additive belief ωo (where only the null event ∅ is
considered as irrelevant). Formally:
ν (A) := (1− δ) · π (A) + δ (λ · ωo (A)) + γ · ωp (A)))
with δ ∈ (0, 1], λ, γ ∈ [0, 1] such that λ+ γ = 1, and
ωo (A) = 1 if A 6= ∅
ωo (A) = 0 if A = ∅
ωp (A) = 0 if A ⊂ S
ωp (A) = 1 if A = S
The CEU of an act f with respect to a neo-additive capacity ν is given by:
CEU (f, ν) = (1− δ) ·
mX
i=1
π (Ai) · u (f (Ai))
+δ ·
µ
λ ·max
s∈S
u (f (s)) + γ ·min
s∈S
u (f (s))
¶
.
We refer to the parameter δ as the decision maker’s degree of ambiguity since it has
a straightforward interpretation as a measure of how confidently the individual be-
lieves that the additive measure π indeed reflects the true probability distribution of
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an underlying random process. The individual’s ambiguity about the additive measure
π is then resolved for neo-additive capacities by focussing on the extreme outcomes
maxs∈S u (f (s)) and mins∈S u (f (s)). How much an ambiguous individual cares about
the best (worst) outcome possible for a chosen act is determined by her degree of opti-
mism λ ∈ [0, 1] (degree of pessimism γ ∈ [0, 1]). For example, if γ = 1 (λ = 1) we speak
of a purely pessimistic (optimistic) decision maker since her ambiguity about the true
probability leads her to particularly focus on the worst (best) consequence associated
with her possible choices.
Remark. Notice that purely optimistic (λ = 1), respectively pessimistic (γ =
1), neo-additive capacities are concave, respectively convex, capacities. CEU decision
makers with optimistic, respectively pessimistic, beliefs are therefore ambiguity prone,
respectively averse, in the sense of Schmeidler’s (1989) definition of ambiguity attitudes.
As a consequence, CEU decision makers with purely pessimistic neo-additive capacities
may commit the two-urn paradox as described in Ellsberg (1961), which violates the
assumption that individuals actually decide under uncertainty as if they assigned some
additive probability measure to events. More recent investigations (Kilka and Weber,
2004; Abdellaoui et al., 2004; Wakker, 2004) suggest that, besides expressing ambiguity
aversion, most decision makers overweight the relevance of rather unlikely events so that
a corresponding probability weighting function would be inversely S-shaped. Such a
decision behavior can be well captured by CEU with respect to neo-additive capacities
such that 0 < γ, λ and λ ≤ γ.
3 A Decision Theoretic Foundation of Abel’s Pes-
simism and Doubt
The representative individual of Abel’s (2002) model (cf. also Lucas, 1978) holds some
asset which produces returns r according to some objectively given probability distribu-
tion π. Suppose that this asset may produce m diﬀerent returns, so that we can assume
some finite partition A1, ..., Am of the state space S whereby greater indices of the events
indicate lower returns, i.e., r (Aj) > r (Aj+1) for j ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}.
In his proposal for a resolution of the riskfree-rate and the equity premium puzzles,
Abel exploits the diﬀerence between the expected utility of the asset-returns with respect
to the objective probability distribution,
Pk
i=1 u (Ai) ·π (Ai), and the according expected
utility of the asset-returns with respect to some subjective probability distribution π∗,
i.e.,
Pk
i=1 u (Ai) · π∗ (Ai). Abel defines a pessimist as follows:
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Definition 3 (Abel, 2002): A decision maker is a pessimist in the sense of Abel, if
and only if, her subjective probability distribution π∗ over asset-returns is (strictly)
first-order stochastically dominated by the objective probability distribution π, i.e.,
for all k ∈ {1, ...,m},
kX
i=1
π∗ (Ai) ≤
kX
i=1
π (Ai)
and for some k ∈ {1, ...,m},
kX
i=1
π∗ (Ai) <
kX
i=1
π (Ai)
Doubt in the sense of Abel is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Abel, 2002): A decision maker is an individual with doubt in the sense
of Abel, if and only if, her subjective probability distribution π∗ over asset-returns
represents a mean-preserving spread of the objective probability distribution π ,i.e.,
E∗(r) =
kX
i=1
π∗ (Ai) · r(Ai) =
mX
i=1
π (Ai) · r(Ai) = E(r)
and
var∗(r) = E∗(r − E∗(r))2 > E(r − E(r))2 = var(r)
Observe that the only relevant act in Abel’s model is holding the asset, so that a CEU
decision maker with non-additive belief ν evaluates the asset as
Pk
i=1 u (Ai)·w (Ai) where
w (Ai) is given by (1).
We now show that our definition of a purely pessimistic CEU decision maker can be
considered as a formal special case of Abel’s definition.
Proposition 1: A representative agent CEU decision maker with neo-additive capacity
ν such that γ = 1 can be equivalently characterized as a pessimist in the sense of
Abel whereby the subjective probability distribution π∗ is defined as follows:
π∗i :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− δ) · π (Ai) for i ∈ {2, ...,m− 1}
(1− δ) · π (Ai) + δ for i = m.
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We next demonstrate that a CEU decision maker might evaluate the asset in Abel’s
model as if she was an expected utility maximizer with subjective (additive) belief π∗
where π∗ is a mean-preserving spread of the true distribution π.
Proposition 2: Consider a representative agent CEU decision maker with neo-additive
capacity ν such that
E (r) = λ · r (A1) + γ · r (Am) (3)
and π (A1) + π (Am) < 1. Such a CEU decision maker can be equivalently char-
acterized as an individual with doubt in the sense of Abel whereby the subjective
probability distribution π∗ is defined as follows:
π∗i :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− δ) · π (Ai) for i ∈ {2, ...,m− 1}
(1− δ) · π (Ai) + δ · λ for i = 1
(1− δ) · π (Ai) + δ · γ for i = m.
Remark. If the distribution of returns is symmetric, then assumption (3) holds iﬀ
λ = γ = 0.5, since, under symmetry, r(A1)− E (r) = E (r)− r(Am).
Remark. The above results are established under the assumption that the CEU
decision maker is the representative agent of the economy. An alternative way to read
our results in Proposition 2 is to assume an economy that is populated by a proportion
λ of purely optimistic decision makers and a proportion γ = 1− λ of purely pessimistic
decision makers.
Remark. As we show in the Appendix, the CEU of an act with respect to a neo-
additive capacity can be equivalently described by the α-minmax expected utility with
respect to multiple priors (α-MEU) (see, e.g., Ghirardato et al., 1998; Ghirardato et
al., 2004; Siniscalchi, 2005). In particular, we establish this equivalence for so-called
ε-contaminated priors used in Bayesian statistics (Berger and Berliner, 1986) under the
two assumptions that (i) the “amount of error”, ε, coincides with the degree of ambiguity,
δ, and (ii) the true probability distribution is contaminated with probability measures
over the worst and best consequences.
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Appendix
A.1 Formal Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Notice that (1) implies for purely pessimistic beliefs, i.e.,
γ = 1,
wi =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− δ) · π (Ai) for i ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}
(1− δ) · π (Ai) + δ for i = m.
The last equation can be equivalently written as
wm = 1− (1− δ) ·
m−1X
i=1
π (Ai)
Now define π∗i := wi for i ∈ {1, ...,m}, so that a CEU decision maker with neo-
additive capacity ν evaluates the asset as if she was an expected utility maximizer with
subjective (additive) belief π∗. Moreover, observe that
kX
i=1
π∗ (Ai) = (1− δ) ·
kX
i=1
π (Ai) <
kX
i=1
π (Ai) for k ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}
and
mX
i=1
π∗ (Ai) =
mX
i=1
π (Ai) = 1
Thus, the accordingly defined subjective pessimistic probability distribution π∗ is (strictly)
first-order stochastically dominated by the objective probability distribution π. This
proves our claim.¤
Proof of Proposition 2: At first notice that assumption (3) entails
E∗(r) =
kX
i=1
(1− δ) · π (Ai) · r(Ai) + δ (λ · r(A1) + γ · r(Am))
= (1− δ) · E (r) + δ · E (r) = E(r),
i.e., π∗ and π have identical mean. Now turn to the variances:
var∗(r) =
mX
i=1
(1− δ) · π (Ai) · [r (Ai)− E (r)]2
+δ · λ · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + δ · γ · [r (Am)− E (r)]2
= (1− δ) · var(r) + δ ¡λ · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + γ · [r (Am)− E (r)]2¢ (4)
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Since
λ · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + γ · [r (Am)− E (r)]2
> π (A1) · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + ...+ π (Am) · [r (Am)− E (r)]2
= var(r)
whenever assumption (3) holds and π (A1) + π (Am) < 1, equation (4) gives the desired
result
var∗(r) > var(r),
i.e., the subjective probability distribution π∗ is a mean-preserving spread of π.¤
A.2 The α-MEU Approach and ε-Contaminated Priors
For a finite state space the α-MEU of an act f is given by
MEU (f, α, P ) = α ·min
p∈P
mX
i=1
p (Ai) · u (f (Ai)) + (1− α) ·max
p∈P
mX
i=1
p (Ai) · u (f (Ai)) ,
where P denotes some convex and compact set of priors. α is the weight associated
with the minmax expected utility as developed in the original multiple prior approach of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) whereas (1− α) is the weight associated with the maxmax
expected utility (Ghirardato et al., 1998). In what follows we characterize the CEU with
respect to a neo-additive capacity as an α-MEU with respect to so-called ε-contaminated
priors that are used in Bayesian statistics.
Rewrite the Choquet expected utility of act f with respect to the neo-additive ca-
pacity ν as follows
CEU (f, ν) = (1− δ) ·
mX
i=1
π (Ai) · u (f (Ai)) + δ ·
µ
λ ·max
s∈S
u (f (s)) + γ ·min
s∈S
u (f (s))
¶
= α ·
mX
i=1
π∗∗ (Ai) · u (f (Ai)) + (1− α) ·
mX
i=1
π∗ (Ai) · u (f (Ai))
with
α = γ ⇔ λ = 1− α
π∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− δ) · π (Ai) for i ∈ {2, ...,m}
(1− δ) · π (Ai) + δ for i = 1
π∗∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− δ) · π (Ai) for i ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}
(1− δ) · π (Ai) + δ for i = m.
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Thus, we can represent CEU of an act with respect to neo-additive capacities by the
α-MEU of an act, i.e.,
MEU (f, α, P ) = CEU (f, ν) , (5)
whenever we have, for the set of priors, P , that
π∗ ∈ argmax
p∈P
mX
i=1
p (Ai) · u (f (Ai)) and
π∗∗ ∈ argmin
p∈P
mX
i=1
p (Ai) · u (f (Ai)) .
For instance, consider the set of priors, Pˆ , that contains all probability measures p that
are dominated - in the sense of first order stochastic dominance - by π∗ whereas all p ∈ P
dominate π∗∗. In that case, (5) is satisfied for every possible specification of the vNM
utility indices.2
A particularly convenient α-MEU characterization of CEU with respect to neo-
additive capacities results from so-called ε-contaminated priors (see, e.g., Berger and
Berliner, 1986). For two probability measures p0 and q, an ε-contaminated prior is
defined as a probability measure
p = (1− ε) · p0 + ε · q
where ε is interpreted as the “amount of error” by which p0 is “contaminated” by the
distribution q. Fix ε = δ and consider the ε-contamination class, P ∗, given by
P ∗ := {p : p = (1− ε) · π + ε · q, q ∈ Q}
such that
Q := {q : q = (1− β) · I1 + β · Im, β ∈ [0, 1]} ,
where I1 (Im) denotes the degenerate probability measure that realizes the best (worst)
consequence with probability one. Observe that π∗ dominates all p ∈ P ∗ whereas every
p ∈ P ∗ dominates π∗∗, implying that
MEU (f, α, P ∗) = CEU (f, ν) .
That is, the CEU of an act f with respect to a neo-additive capacity ν can be
equivalently characterized as the α-MEU of the act f with respect to the ε-contamination
class P ∗. In that case, α coincides with the degree of pessimism, γ; the amount of error,
ε, coincides with the degree of ambiguity, δ; and the true probability measure, π, is
2Also compare Section 3.2.2 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) who consider a strict subset of Pˆ .
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contaminated by all probability measures containing the best or the worst consequence
in their support. Moreover, the ε-contaminated priors in P ∗ can be interpreted as neo-
additive capacities such that ε denotes the degree of ambiguity and β ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the degree of pessimism.
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